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Abstract: 
Since January 1, 2005, the Dutch tax litigation comprises an appeals court. Before 2005, it 
had but one court of instance. That means that now, after a court of first instance has given 
its verdict in a tax dispute, an unsatisfied party may appeal to a higher instance, where this 
was impossible before. In this paper we investigate which consequences introducing an 
appeals court has for the way tax payers and the tax administration solve their disputes. We 
focus on the following questions. Are more or less tax payers willing to go to court to solve 
the dispute? Is it more or less difficult for parties to agree upon a settlement? Which appeal 
rate can we expect? What is the role of trust in the courts in the answers to the questions 
above?  
 
 
 
JEL classification: K41 
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1 Introduction 
In the Netherlands, tax payers who dispute their tax assessment first go through the 
objection procedure under the auspices of the tax administration itself. If at the end of that 
procedure the final assessment is still disputed, the tax payer may go to court. Before 
January 1, 2005 the tax payer had to bring his case to the ‘Gerechtshof’. In the Netherlands, 
this was the only instance which considered the substantive merits of the case. Hence, 
neither side could appeal the judgment of the court on the grounds that the court misjudged 
the facts. 
Since January 1, 2005, such disputes are first brought to a ‘Rechtbank’. This court also 
considers the substantive arguments. After its verdict, parties now do have the option to 
appeal on substantive arguments, namely to the ‘Gerechtshof’. 
 
The possibility to appeal increases the number of options open to the players. Whereas 
before 2005 the dispute would stop after the verdict of the first trial, now the dispute may 
continue. The option to appeal can be an advantage if the first trial is lost. But it can also be a 
disadvantage if the first trial is won but the other party does not give up. Moreover if players 
go to court for the second time, they face additional costs. 
 
The goal of this paper is to gain insight in the consequences of the introduction of an 
appeals court for the choices made by the tax payer and the tax administration with regard to 
ending the dispute. We are especially interested in the following questions: 
1. Are tax payers more or less willing to go to court over the dispute?  
2. Are players more or less likely to settle their dispute?  
3. To what degree will players appeal the decision of the court of first instance? 
4. How does the confidence society has in the courts affect the answers to the questions 
above? 
 
There seems to be no economic literature in which the decision to go to court in the first 
instance is modeled together with the possibility to appeal. The papers who study the 
appeals process focus on the internal organization and dynamics of the judicial system, not 
on the choices by the parties in the dispute. For example, Shavell (1995) investigates how 
the judiciary should be arranged in order to minimize the combined costs of a mistake in the 
last verdict and the legal costs to all parties. He finds that a court of second instance can be 
beneficial, if the court of second instance gets relatively more means so that it is more 
reliable than the court of first instance, parties get the option to appeal or not, and the proper 
(dis)incentives to appeal, via court fees or subsidies, are in place. Spitzer and Talley (2000) 
analyze the policy choices that the higher court could make in reviewing verdicts of lower 
courts when lower courts may not only make mistakes, but may also have an ideological 
bias. Daughety and Reinganum (1999 and 2000) analyze how later verdicts in a case are 
affected if the information contained in the earlier verdicts and the decisions to appeal are 
taken into account. 
 
In this paper we look at the connection of the courts in first and second instance from the 
other side, namely from the perspective of the parties in the dispute. How is the decision to 
go to court of first instance affected if players may appeal its verdict? The paper is organized 
as follows. In Section 2 we introduce two models: model OLD and model NEW. OLD 
represents the old situation, in which no appeal is possible. NEW represents the new 
situation, where players can appeal the decision of the court of first instance. Section 3 
discusses model OLD briefly, as it is well-known in the literature. Section 4 analyzes how 
NEW differs from OLD. This analysis continues in Section 5, where we see how the 
outcomes are affected if players learn about their chances in the court of second instance 
from the verdict in first instance. In this section we also discuss the role of the confidence 
players have in the courts. Section 6 puts our results in a broader context, where we pay 
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attention to some aspects outside the scope of our model. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the 
conclusions. 
2 The Model 
There are two players1, the tax payer (P) and the tax administration (A). Before, P received 
a tax assessment from A. Disagreeing with the assessment of A, P objected. At the end of 
the objection procedure, however, P still feels that the final assessment is too high, say by an 
amount Y. Hence there remains a conflict between A and P. Now each player chooses its 
strategy to resolve this dispute. The options to the players are given in the game tree of 
Figure 1.  
 
We distinguish two stages in the game. Stage 1, reflecting the old situation, is the left part 
of Figure 1, which ends with the verdict of the court of first instance. Model OLD consists of 
this first stage only. Stage 2 starts after the verdict of the court of first instance. It can be 
partitioned into two subgames: Part 2P, if player P won the first trial, and Part 2A if player A 
won the first trial. Stage 2 reflects the additional options after introducing the additional 
instance. Model NEW comprises both stages. The relevant stage or part of the model is 
indicated by subscript g. When only the stages as such are relevant, g ∈ {1, 2}; whenever it 
is necessary to make a distinction between the two parts of Stage 2, g ∈ {1, 2P, 2A}.  
In each part of the model players first have the option to settle (S) or not settle (NS). If the 
players settle, they agree on the amount (denoted by SAg) which P should pay to A. After 
that the game ends. If not, the player who is unhappy with the current decision (the 
unsatisfied player)2, say player i, may go to court (C) or give up (G). If i gives up, the game 
ends and the current decision is implemented. If i does go to court, he pays court fee fgi, and 
each player j pays his legal costs cgj. If player i wins that trial, the court fee for this trial is 
refunded. If the last trial before the game ends is won by player P, then A is ordered for 
costs, that is, A has to refund part3 of the legal costs of P. This refund equals q1 if the players 
only went to the court of first instance, and it equals q1 + q2 if the players went to the appeals 
court too.  
Let πi denote the payoff to player i. Further, let pgi be the estimated probability by i of 
winning the trial in Part g, and Ei(π gi) his expected value of that trial. The true probability of i 
winning a trial is not known.  
We assume that there is no breakdown in bargaining if the bargaining set is non-empty: 
provided that the unsatisfied player has a credible threat of going to court and that there 
exists some settlement amount which both players prefer to another trial, then such a 
settlement will be reached. As such, we can model the decision of accepting the settlement 
or not as the decision of the satisfied player only. Specifically, in our numerical analysis we 
assume that the settlement amount lies halfway between the lower and upper bound of the 
bargaining set. This can be expected if both players have equal bargaining power. 
 
Finally, in model OLD the strategy for player P is given by sP ∈ {G, C}; and the strategy for 
player A by sA ∈ {S, NS}. In model NEW the strategy for player P, sP, is given by the triplet 
(s1P, s2PP, s2AP), where s1P, s2AP ∈ {G, C} and  s2PP ∈ {S, NS}; and the strategy for player A by 
(s1A, s2PA, s2AA), where s1A, s2AA ∈ {S, NS} and  s2PA ∈ {G, C}. 
 
                                                
1 To keep the results tractable, we assume that the players are risk neutral. 
2 So player P in Stage 1 and Part 2A, and player A in Part 2P. 
3 In the Netherlands, refunds of legal costs are based on a point system. Generally the amount 
refunded is (substantially) less than the actual legal costs incurred. Moreover, although it is in principle 
possible that tax payers are ordered to refund the legal costs made by the tax administration, this only 
rarely happens. 
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3 Model OLD 
Model OLD is just an application of the well-known divergent expectations (DE) model from 
the literature4. Therefore we will discuss this model and its results only briefly.  
 
Note first that 
EP(π 1P) =  – p1P (c1P – q1) – (1 – p1P) (Y + f1P + c1P) (2) 
and 
EA(π1A) =  p1A (Y – c1A) + (1 – p1A) ( – c1A – q1) (3) 
Therefore in any subgame perfect equilibrium, sP = C if  
p1P  > (f1P + c1P) / (Y + f1P + q1),  
and sP = G if  
p1P  ≤ (f1P + c1P) / (Y + f1P + q1). (4) 
So P will give up and accept the final assessment of A, unless P has sufficient faith in his 
chances to win the trial (i.e. if p1P is high enough). Note that P will not have a credible threat, 
regardless of his estimated chances in court, if Y + q1 < c1P, that is: if the refund of legal costs 
does not cover the real legal costs, and Y is small enough.  
Obviously, A will not agree to settle if P is not willing to go to court. However, if P is willing 
to go to court, a settlement may still be impossible. The minimum A demands equals his 
expected benefit of going to court EA(π1A), while the maximum P is willing to pay is equal to 
his expected loss of going to court, namely EP(π1P). Hence, a settlement is possible only if  
p1A (Y – c1A) + (1 – p1A) (– c1A – q1) ≤ p1P (c1P – q1) + (1 – p1P) (Y + f1P + c1P). (5) 
Rearranging Condition (5) yields 
(p1P + p1A – 1) (Y + q1) ≤ c1P + c1A + (1 – p1P) f1P. (6) 
The right-hand side (RHS) equals the costs which parties can save by not going to trial. 
The left-hand side (LHS) equals the amount by which their joint claim exceeds the amount to 
be divided (Y + q1). Thus if the LHS is not larger than the RHS, then the costs of going to 
court outweigh the sum of the perceived benefits of going to trial, and players will choose to 
settle. This is always true if p1P + p1A ≤ 1.  However, if players are jointly optimistic, defined as 
p1P + p1A > 1, then it can occur that their joint claim on the money exceeds the costs of trial. 
In that case, players will go to court. 
 
Thus the subgame perfect equilibrium is:  
− (G, NS)  if Condition (4) holds,  
− (C, S)  if Condition (4) does not hold, but Condition (5) does, and  
− (C, NS)  if Conditions (4) and (5) are both violated.  
 
Figure 2 shows how, given some set of parameters, the subgame perfect strategies 
depend on the beliefs of the players. For each point in area G, P will give up. For each point 
in area S the players will settle, and for the points in area C the players will go to court. 
From Condition (4) it is clear that the border between G and S is vertical, because the 
willingness of P to go to court depends only on his own estimate of his chances in court. 
Moreover, we see that the border lies more to the right the lower Y and q1 are, and the higher 
f1P or c1P are. 
 
                                                
4 See for example Shavell (1982). 
 - 5 -
0
1
0 1
p1P
p1A
C
S
G
 
Figure 2. Model OLD summarized 
 
Condition (5) shows that the border between S and C is downward sloping because the 
players will go to court only if p1P + p1A is large enough. Moreover, we see that the border 
shifts to the right if Y or q1 decreases (because the joint claim becomes lower), or if c1P, c1A or 
f1P increases (because the total costs of trial become higher). 
 
Summarizing, the conclusions for model OLD are the following: 
1. Parties will go to court only if they are jointly optimistic, so if p1P + p1A > 1. 
2. The probability of a trial increases in: 
− the degree of joint optimism, 
− the disputed amount Y, 
− the refund of legal costs (q1) if P wins, 
and decreases in:  
− the costs related to a legal procedure: c1P, c1A and/or f1P. 
3. When the refund of legal costs is incomplete, player P has no credible threat if the 
disputed amount Y is sufficiently small. Such small disputes will never go to court. 
4 Model NEW 
In this section we investigate the effects of the introduction of an appeals court. Whereas in 
model OLD the verdict of the court of first instance was automatically executed, now the 
player who lost in first instance may appeal the verdict at the court of second instance. The 
resulting model, model NEW, also includes the right half of Figure 1 (Stage 2). 
Clearly, as a result of the additional options to the players in NEW, the expected benefit of 
going to court in Stage 1 may differ from that in OLD. Therefore the optimal strategies in 
NEW for Stage 1 can differ from those in OLD. 
Moreover, it is quite possible that the confidence players have in their case is affected by 
the trial. The trial may for example uncover hitherto unknown information, and the judgment 
of the court itself will often carry some weight too. 
 
We start the analysis by studying the decisions of players during Stage 2 in Section 4.1. In 
Section 4.2 we study the consequences on Stage 1 of the model. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 
compare models OLD and NEW. In this comparison we assume that the beliefs of the 
players do not change during the conflict, thus p1P = p2PP = p2AP = pP, and p1A = p2PA = p2AA = 
pA. In Section 5 we allow players to learn from the verdict by the first court. There we will also 
see how the players’ strategies are affected by the trust they have in the courts.  
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4.1 Stage Two: The decision to appeal 
After the verdict by the first court, players may (again) choose to settle or, if not, to appeal. 
In this section we derive under what conditions players will settle, go to the court of second 
instance or abide by the standing verdict.  
Suppose first that P won the first trial. Analogous to Conditions (4) and (5), we know that A 
will give up if 
 p2A  ≤ (f2A + c2A + q2) / (Y + f2A + q1 + q2). (4P) 
If A will indeed give up, player P will refuse to settle. If A is willing to appeal, the players 
may decide to settle. That will occur if the costs of a second trial are not exceeded by the 
amount by which the players jointly overestimate their expected benefit in the appeals court. 
Specifically: 
(p2P  + p2A – 1) (Y + q1 + q2) ≤ c2P + c2A + (1 – p2A) f2A. (6P) 
 
0
1
0 1
p2P
p2A
G
S
C
 
Figure 3a. Part 2P summarized 
0
1
0 1
p2P
p2A
G
S
C
 
Figure 3b. Part 2A summarized  
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If A won the first trial, the corresponding conditions are 
p2P  ≤ (f2P + c2P) / (Y + f2P + q1 + q2). (4A) 
 (p2P  + p2A – 1) (Y + q1 + q2) ≤ c2P + c2A + (1 – p2P) f2P. (6A) 
 
We represent these conditions graphically in Figures 3a (for Part 2P) and 3b (Part 2A). The 
areas are again denoted by G (give up), S (settle), and C (going to court).  
 
Clearly, before the game reaches the second stage, players have to go to the court of first 
instance. Suppose that during the first stage players do not take the right to appeal into 
consideration. So Section 3 holds for the first stage decision making. Suppose also that for 
each players the estimated probability of winning the trial (if any) is the same during Stage 2 
as it is during Stage 1. Then players will always appeal the verdict of the court of first 
instance if Conditions (6P) and (6A) are less strict than Condition (6).  
In general, it is unclear whether that is the case. On the one hand, the amount disputed has 
increased from Y + q1 to Y + q1 + q2, which makes going to court more attractive. On the 
other hand, the (additional) costs of a trial are different. In the second stage they are either 
c2P + c2A + (1 – p2A) f2A or c2P + c2A + (1 – p2P) f2P, while in the first stage they are c1P + c1A + (1 
– p1P) f1P.  
However, conversations with Dutch tax advisers suggest that the following stylized facts 
apply in the Dutch case. First, court fees in tax cases are small compared to the legal costs 
and these court fees are not much larger in the second stage of the model than in the first 
stage. Second, the legal costs in an appeal are substantially smaller than in the first trial, 
because the case has already been prepared and defended. So commonly, the total costs to 
the players of the second trial will be lower than those of the first trial. 
Taking these stylized facts into account, we see that in the second stage the reasons to go 
to court are stronger than in the first stage. Therefore the losing player will always appeal. 
 
Summarizing, the analysis of the appeals decision yields the following conclusions. 
1. As in the first stage, players will go to court only if they are jointly optimistic. 
2. On the basis of our estimates on the legal costs in the second stage, relative to 
those in the first stage, and assuming that the expected probability of winning is the 
same in both stages of the game, the appeal rate will equal one. 
4.2 Stage One: The decision to go to the court of first instance 
Of course, players in first stage decision making do (eventually) recognize that the game 
does not end after the first trial. This knowledge affects the net benefits which they expect 
from a trial, and may therefore affect their actions in the first stage. This is illustrated in this 
Section. Naturally, it now becomes relevant which result players would reach in the second 
stage, as it affects their expected benefit of going to court in the first stage, and therefore 
their behavior. For simplicity we assume that p2Pi = p2Ai = p2i for i = P, A.  
Figure 4 provides a graphic illustration5. Each area in it has a three letter code, where as 
before G means ‘give up’, S means ‘settle’ and C means ‘go to court’. The second and third  
letters of each code refer to the outcome if players would go to court in the first stage and 
player P respectively player A would win that trial, i.e. Parts 2P and 2A of Stage 2. The first 
letter refers to the combination of players’ choices in Stage 1.  
 
Focus on the areas GCC, SCC and CCC. For these combinations of beliefs players know 
that if they go to court, there will follow an appeal trial for sure, regardless of which player 
looses. Knowing this, the expected payoff to player P to go to court is equal to 
EP(π 1P) =  –  p2P (c1P + c2P  – q1 – q2 + (1 – p1P) f1P)  
– (1 – p2P) (Y + c1P + c2P  + (1 – p1P) (f1P +f2P)) (2I) 
                                                
5 This figure is based on a Scenario 1, of Table 1 in Section 4.3, where p2i = p1i = pi, for i = P, A. 
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Figure 4. Model NEW, all three parts integrated 
 
Player P is only willing to go to court if the expected costs are lower than paying the 
disputed amount. So, there exists6 some value x such that P gives up if and only if p1P ≤ x 
(see the vertical line in Figure 4). 
If P has a credible threat, then he may decide to settle. Analogous to Condition (6), a 
settlement will occur if 
(p1P + p1A – 1) (Y + q1 + q2) ≤ c1P + c2P + c1A 
 + c2A + (1 – p1P) f1P + (1 – p1P) (1 – p2P) f2P+ (1 – p1A) (1 – p2A) f2P. (6I) 
As in Condition (6), the RHS gives the expected costs of going to court when an appeal is 
certain. The LHS gives the amount by which the parties jointly overestimate the money that 
the final verdict will assign to them. At the border between SCC and CCC Condition (6I) 
holds with equality.  
The other areas are derived in similar ways, and we can interpret them in a similar fashion. 
Consider for instance a point in the area SGS. The parameters there are such that player A 
will give up if he loses in the court of first instance. In contrast, if A wins the first trial, player P 
is willing to appeal the verdict and given this threat the players will negotiate a settlement. As 
a consequence of these A prefers to avoid a trial in first instance by offering an acceptable 
settlement to P.   
4.3 The effects of introducing the court of second instance 
It is clear that Conditions (2I) and (6I) depend on a large number of parameters, while at 
the same time they are quadratic in the beliefs of the players. Since the magnitude of the 
parameters relative to each other is analytically also unknown, it will be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to derive meaningful results in a purely analytical way.  
Instead, we follow a numerical approach. In Table 1 we present 7 scenarios, constructed 
after conversations with Dutch tax advisors, which jointly should give a fairly representative 
insight in the relevant factors.  
` 
In Scenario 0, the tax payer is an individual who will represent himself in court. In 
Scenarios 1 to 6 the tax payer is a firm that will hire professionals to represent it in court. We 
make two more assumptions, as is apparent from Table 1. First, we assume that the legal 
costs during an appeal are 50 percent of the legal costs during the first trial, for the case has 
                                                
6 Note that if Y + q1 + q2  ≤ c1P + c2P + (1 – p1P) f1P, then x ≥ 1 and player P certainly gives up.  
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been prepared and argued before. Second, we assume that the refund of legal costs is the 
same for a trial in first instance as for a trial in second instance.  
 
 
We assume that the probability estimate of a player of winning a trial is constant. 
Specifically, pgi = pg’i for all g, g’ ∈ {1, 2P, 2A} and i = P, A. Figure 5 shows the results of 
Scenario 1. The figures summarizing the results for scenarios 2 to 6 are similar and are 
shown in the appendix. Scenario 0 gives a different figure, which we will discuss in a 
moment. In these figures, the white lines give the results in model OLD, while the black lines 
give the results for model NEW. These black lines originate from Figure 2, where the areas 
with the same first letter are joint. The areas G and S give the belief coordinates for which 
during the first stage P will give up respectively the players will settle the dispute. For the 
coordinates in area C, the players will go to the court of first instance and, in the NEW 
situation, also to the appeals court.  
 
Comparing the two models, we see that fewer disputes will be brought to court. The 
explanation is simple. Note first that, since an appeal is certain, the court proceedings will 
only end with a verdict of the court of second instance. Second, note that the disputed 
amount in both stages is similar, while the combined legal costs of two trials are substantially 
higher than after the first trial7. Therefore players have more incentives to settle in NEW than 
in OLD. 
 
0
1
0 1
pP
 pA
G C
S
0.155
0.250
0.240
0.230
0.355
0.363
0.087
 
Figure 5. Scenario 1, model OLD (white) and model NEW (black) 
 
                                                
7 Compare Conditions (5) and (5I) 
Table 1. Description of the Scenarios 
# Y c1P c1A c2P c2A q1 = q2 f1P f2P f2A
0 1.000 200 2.000 100 1.000 20 37 103 414
1 20.000 3.000 2.000 1.500 1.000 800 276 414 414
2 20.000 3.000 3.000 1.500 1.500 800 276 414 414
3 20.000 8.000 3.000 4.000 1.500 800 276 414 414
4 20.000 8.000 3.000 4.000 1.500 1.200 276 414 414
5 100.000 8.000 3.000 4.000 1.500 800 276 414 414
6 1.000.000 50.000 4.000 25.000 2.000 1.200 276 414 414
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A second difference between NEW and OLD is that the border between G and S is more to 
the left in NEW if A has little faith in its chances, while it is more to the right if A has much 
faith in its chances. The intuition is the following. If P has a credible threat in Stage 1, he also 
has a credible threat in Stage 2, because the additional costs of an appeals process are 
substantially lower, while the disputed amount has not changed much8. If A has little 
confidence, then P loses little by the right of A to appeal, for either A has not even a credible 
threat, or A has a relatively weak bargaining position so that P will obtain a favorable 
settlement. And if P loses the first trial, then he still gets a relatively favorable settlement. 
Hence, going to court is more appealing to P in NEW than in OLD. But it is also clear that as 
pA increases, any settlement in the second stage becomes less favorable to P. So, from 
some point onwards, the minimum value of pP such that P has a credible threat increases in 
pA. This gives the upward sloping border. If pA and pP are sufficiently large, then an appeal is 
certain. In that case pA does not affect the benefits which P expects from going to court. 
Hence, for pA large enough, the border is vertical. This part of the border is to the right of the 
border in OLD, because the amount of legal costs which may be refunded by court order will 
typically not cover all of those costs. So, the expected costs associated with going to the first 
court and the certain appeal are higher than the costs of going to court in OLD. Hence, to 
have a credible threat P must have a stronger faith in his chances in model NEW than in 
model OLD if pA is high.  
 
Scenarios 2 to 6 reveal the same image as Scenario 1. The odd one out is Scenario 0, of 
which the results are depicted in Figure 6. It differs in the sense that the players will not go to 
trial, because the certain costs to A are larger than the disputed amount. Whether P can 
threaten credibly, still depends on the expected payoff from going to court. Moreover, in 
model NEW player P will sooner have a credible threat, as the relatively high legal costs of A 
ensure that A is loathe to use the option to appeal and that A has a weak bargaining position. 
 
Summarizing, we can conclude for model NEW that: 
1. The introduction of an appeals court leads to less trials in the first stage, thus the 
necessary degree of joint optimism becomes larger. 
2. All trials in the first stage are followed by an appeal in the second stage. 
3. It is uncertain whether tax payers who disagree with their tax assessment will more 
or less often give up. This depends on the actual distribution of the parties’ 
estimated probabilities of winning. 
0
1
0 1
pP
 pA SG
0.2240.178
 
Figure 6. Scenario 0, model OLD (white) and model NEW (black) 
                                                
8 Compare Conditions (2) and (2I). 
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4.4 How the variables affect the results. 
By comparing the different scenarios we also gain insight into the roles of the other 
variables, apart from the combination of beliefs (pP, pA). The values of these other variables 
determine the positions of the border lines between the strategy profiles.  
 
We first look at the effects on the credibility of player P not giving up. In model OLD, these 
threats were more likely to be credible when Y and q1 increased and the legal costs f1 and c1P 
decreased. In model NEW the variables related to the second stage can play a role too.  
If one of the possible outcomes of going to court in Stage 1 is a settlement in the second 
stage, then P has more incentives to go to court if this settlement is more favorable to him. 
Any settlement in the second stage becomes more favorable to P if c2P and (if applicable) f2P 
are lower and c2A,  q2 and (if applicable) f2A are higher, because expected costs to P weaken 
his bargaining position, while expected costs to A strengthen it.  
Clearly it is also relevant whether A is willing to appeal after losing in the first stage. 
Therefore, if a small increase in Y or q1, or a small decrease in c2A, f2A and q2 gives A a 
credible threat, where A did not have one before, the incentives of P to go to court in the first 
stage decrease. On the other hand, an increase in Y or q1 may give P a credible threat in 
stage 2, where P had none before, just as a decrease in c2P and f2P and an increase in q2 
would. In that case P needs less faith in his case to threaten credibly in the first stage. 
Finally, if one of the verdicts in the first stage leads to an appeal in the second, the 
expected benefits to player P of going to court in the first stage depend positively on the 
expected benefits of that appeal.  
Summarizing, we see that generally an increase in Y, q1, q2, c2A and f2A and a decrease in 
c1P, f1P, c2P and f2P give P more incentives to go to court, if a settlement is not obtained. This 
is also apparent by comparing Scenarios 1 and 2 (for c1A and c2A), 2 and 3 (for c1P and c2P), 3 
and 4 (for q1 and q2), and 3 and 5 (for Y). 
 
These scenarios show with respect to the decision whether to go to court or to settle, that – 
as one would expect, see Condition (6I) – players are less likely to go to court if the disputed 
amount Y and (possible) refunds q are smaller, and the costs related to going to any court, c 
and f, are higher.  
5 Learning from the first trial 
Before, the chances which the players gave themselves in the second stage of the game 
were unaffected by the trial in the first stage. This is unlikely for a couple of reasons. First, 
during the trial in the first stage both players have to present the information on which they 
base their case. Hence if players differed in opinion because of asymmetric information, at 
least one player will change his opinion. Second, the verdict of the judge, who is an expert in 
the field, will generally carry some weight too.  
In this section we analyze what changes if we allow players to adjust their beliefs according 
to the verdict of the first court, or, in other words, if players learn from the court’s verdict. We 
shall see that this may lead to appeal rates of less than one, whereas they were equal to one 
in Section 4. 
In Section 5.1, we expand the model to incorporate this learning process. Section 5.2 
discusses the special case in which the players trust the courts perfectly. Section 5.3 
discusses the general relation between beliefs in the two stages when this trust is imperfect. 
In other words, players believe that courts can make mistakes. In Sections 5.4 and 5.5 we 
apply the case of imperfect trust to the setting of tax disputes. In Section 5.4 we assume that 
players are myopic. So during the first stage they are not aware that the verdict of the first 
court will affect their own judgments. In Section 5.5 we study the case of far-sighted players, 
who at the start of the game are fully aware what their future beliefs will be at any point in the 
game tree. 
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5.1 Dissecting the estimated probability of winning 
In case of a dispute brought to trial, a player can win the case in two ways. First, he may be 
right, and the court’s verdict is correct. Second, the player may be wrong, but the court 
makes a mistake. 
Hence, in Stage 1 of the game, the probability with which player i thinks he wins a trial (p1i) 
can be dissected into two elements: his estimate of the probability that he is right (ρ1i, where 
0 ≤ ρ1i ≤ 1), and his confidence in the court of first instance9 (r1i, where 0 ≤ r1i ≤ 1).  So in Part 
g, player i expects that his chances of winning in court are given by 
p1i = ρ1i  r1i + (1 – ρ1i) (1 – r1i).  (7) 
We assume that the confidence in every court is socially determined, and not individually. 
Therefore rgi = rg for any player i and for both stages of the game. 
 
There are two reasons why for instance p2Pi may differ from p1i. First, the confidence in the 
appeals court may differ from the confidence in the first court. Second, after the verdict of the 
first court player i may change his belief on the probability that he is right.  
With respect to the first reason, we note that it is credible that society puts more trust in the 
appeals courts than in the district courts10, because judges in the appeals courts are typically 
more experienced, appeals courts take more time for the case, and whereas the first court 
may consist of a single judge, appeals courts consist of several judges. Therefore we 
assume that r2 ≥ r1. 
With respect to the second reason, note that whenever r1 ≠ ½ the verdict is effectively a 
signal of which player is right. In this section players will interpret this signal in a way which is 
consistent with both their initial belief (their prior) and the confidence which they have in the 
court’s verdict. More specifically we assume that players update their beliefs according to 
Bayes’ rule. 
Formally, if player i won the first trial, he believes that the probability with which he is right 
is equal to11 
ρ2+i = ρ1i r1 / (ρ1i r1 + (1 – ρ1i) (1 – r1)). (8+) 
Similarly, if i lost the first trial, he believes that the probability with which he is right is equal 
to 
ρ2-i = ρ1i (1 – r1) / (ρ1i (1 – r1) + (1 – ρ1i) r1). (8-) 
Analogous to Eq. (7) and given the adjusted beliefs (ρ2+i or ρ2-i) and the confidence in the 
appeals court (r2), player i expects to win an appeal case with the following probability after 
having won respectively lost the first trial  
p2+i = ρ2+i r2 + (1 – ρ2+i) (1 – r2) (9+) 
p2-i = ρ2-i r2 + (1 – ρ2-i) (1 – r2). (9-) 
In the rest of Section 5 we explore the consequences of players who update (learn) 
according to Bayes’ rule. 
5.2 Perfect confidence in the courts 
We start with the special case in which the trust in every court is complete. So players 
believe that the court’s verdict is the right one, i.e. r1 = r2 = 1.12 If that is the case, then Eqs. 
(6) to (9-) can be simplified to p1i = ρ1i; ρ2+i = 1 and ρ2-i = 0; p2+i = 1, and p2-i = 0. 
                                                
9 We define the (level of) confidence in a court as the probability with which that court is expected to 
judge correctly. 
10 This is consistent with Shavell (1995). 
11 The numerator is equal to the probability (estimated by player i) that player i is right and wins the 
first trial. The denominator gives his estimated probability of winning the first trial. The ratio therefore 
gives player i’s estimate of the probability that he is right given that he won the first trial.  
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Thus players adopt in the second stage the verdict of the court of first instance. In this 
case, we can draw three conclusions, the first of which is: 
 
1. The court’s verdict will be executed, because – lacking a credible threat – the 
player who lost will give up.  
 
The last two conclusions depend on whether players are myopic or far-sighted. During  
Stage 1, myopic players do not know that their beliefs in Stage 2 are affected by the outcome 
of the first trial. Far-sighted players however realize at the start of the conflict the full 
consequences of the decision by the court of first instance.  
 
2. If the players are myopic, during the first stage they act conform the analysis in 
Section 4.3, for they expect that p2i = p1i. Of course, Conclusion 1 applies in the 
second stage. 
3. If the players are far-sighted, they know that there will never be an appeal or a 
settlement after the first trial. Hence they act as if they are in model OLD (Section 
3). 
5.3 Imperfect confidence in the courts 
We now consider the more realistic case, where the confidence that society has in the 
courts is limited. Courts fail sometimes, and players know that. On the other hand, we also 
assume that players trust that the verdict of the courts is more reliable than the flipping of a 
coin. Therefore we obtain that ½ < r1 ≤ r2 < 1.  
 
In this section we analyze what these assumptions imply for the probabilities estimated by 
the players. We start by rewriting Eq. (7) as 
p1i = (1 – r1) + ρ1i (2 r1 – 1). (10) 
Then from ½ < r1 < 1 it immediately follows that 
1. The estimate of player i of the probability of winning the first trial, p1i, is correlated 
positively with his estimate of the probability that he is right. 
2. Therefore p1i is minimally equal to the probability with which the court is mistaken (1 
– r1), namely if ρ1i = 0, and maximally equal to the probability with which the court is 
right (r1), namely if ρ1i = 1. 
3. If ρ1i < ½ then the possibility of a mistake by the court ensures that p1i > ρ1i, and if ρ1i 
> ½ this probability of wrong verdicts ensures that p1i < ρ1i. Moreover, the difference 
between p1i and ρ1i increases in the probability of mistakes by the court. 
 
Furthermore Eq. (10) implies that 
(p1P  + p1A – 1) = (2 r1 – 1) (ρ1P + ρ1A – 1), (11) 
which yields us the following two results: 
4. Players are jointly optimistic with respect to their chances in court if and only if they 
are jointly optimistic about their chances of being right. 
5. If players are jointly optimistic with respect to their chances of being right, their joint 
optimism increases with their confidence in the court. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
12 To avoid complications we assume in this section on perfect confidence that initially none of the 
players is absolutely certain about who is right, so 0 < ρ1i < 1. 
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We continue by considering the adjustments of the beliefs, see Eqs. (8-) and (8+). It is 
easily derived13 that ρ2-i ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ2+i. The equalities occur if and only if ρ1 is equal to one or to 
zero, for then, if a verdict is consistent with a player’s belief, then he learns nothing new, 
while if the verdict is inconsistent, the player is certain that the verdict is wrong. If players are 
not completely certain about who is right, they will use the information incorporated in the 
court’s verdict. The player who loses will adjust his belief that he is right (ρ), downward, while 
the player who won will adjust his belief ρ upward. 
 
Finally, we will consider the estimated probabilities of winning the appeals case, see Eqs. 
(9+) and (9-). We can rewrite these as  
p2+i = (1 – r2) + ρ2+i (2r2 – 1), (12+) 
respectively 
p2-i = (1 – r2) + ρ2-i (2r2 – 1). (12-) 
This leads to the following conclusions. 
6. Taking for granted that r2 > ½, the estimated probability of winning an appeal trial 
(p2+i or p2+i) is positively correlated with the belief that one is right (ρ2+i respectively 
ρ2-i). 
7. The range of probability estimates is limited to (1 – r2) ≤ p2-i, p2+i ≤ r2. 
8. If the confidence put in the different courts does not differ, so if r1 = r2, then it is easy 
to see14 that p2-i ≤ p1i ≤ p2+i. 
9. Unfortunately, in the more general case where r2 > r1, the relation between the 
estimated probability of winning in Stages 1 and 2 is unclear. The reason is that 
both the beliefs and the confidence in the accuracy of the verdict change. For 
instance: suppose that the player who won at the first trial believed that he was 
probably wrong. As a result of winning, he now has more confidence that he is right, 
but still this belief may be smaller15 than ½. Thus the player still prefers that during 
any appeals the judges make a mistake. Suppose now that the judgment of the 
court of second instance is trusted more than that of the court of first instance, so a 
mistake in the second trial is less likely than in the first trial. Then in total this player 
may think that his chances of winning in the second stage are smaller than the 
chances he gave himself of winning in the first stage. 
 
Furthermore, Eqs. (12+) and (12-) imply that  
p2+i + p2-j – 1 = (2 r2 – 1) r1 (1 – r1) (ρ1i + ρ1j – 1) / (p1i (1 – p1j)),   where i ≠ j. (13) 
Hence there is joint optimism with respect to the chances in court in Stage 2 if and only if 
there is such joint optimism in Stage 1. However, we cannot say whether in the second stage 
players are jointly more or less optimistic than in the first stage. 
5.4 Players are myopic 
We are especially interested in the effects of this learning on the strategies of players in tax 
disputes. In this section we assume that players are myopic. By that, we mean that players 
do not realize beforehand that the verdict in first instance contains information which may 
change the beliefs of players. Hence, the analysis of the first stage in Section 4 fully applies 
to the first stage here. Once the court of first instance has given his decision, players do 
                                                
13 Note that, because (1 – r1) ≤ p1i ≤ r1, the denominator of Eq. (6+), p1i, is at most equal to r1, while 
the denominator of Eq. (6-), (1-p1i), is at least equal to (1-r1). 
14 Recall that pgi increases in ρgi and that ρ2-i ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ2+. 
15 This happens if the confidence in the first court is low enough. 
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learn from it and hold different beliefs. During the second stage players may therefore act 
differently than in Section 4. 
 
In Section 4 we found an appeal rate equal to one. The reason was that the legal costs of 
one more trial were lower, while the disputed amount had not. However, there the estimated 
probabilities of winning were the same for both stages. With (myopic) updating this is no 
longer true.  
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Figure 7a. Scenario 1, myopic players, r1 = r2 = 0.95: P wins the first trial 
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Figure 7b. Scenario 1, myopic players, r1 = r2 = 0.95: A wins the first trial 
 
Figure 7 shows the possible consequences. It is based on the parameters of Scenario 1, 
and the society has relatively much and equal confidence in the courts: r1 = r2 = 0.95.16 Note 
that the results for the first stage are identical to those in Figure 5.17 In the second stage 
                                                
16 Below, we will discuss the cases where the confidence in both instances, respectively in the first 
instance only, is significantly lower. 
17 Note however that the axis now contain ρ1P and ρ1A instead of p1P and p1A. Eq. (10) shows that, 
given r1, there is a positive linear relation between ρ1i and p1i, where i = P, A. For r1 = r2 = 0.95 the 
relation is given by p1i = 0.05 + 0.9 ρ1i. The line ρ1i = 0.117 in Figure 7 therefore corresponds to the line 
p1i = 0.155 in Figure 5. 
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however, the unsatisfied player has now lost some faith in his case. Therefore, he may now 
prefer giving up to appealing to the court of second instance. And when the unsatisfied 
player still has a credible threat, the players may now be jointly less optimistic than in the first 
stage because they learned from the verdict. As a result, it is possible that players go to court 
in the first stage, while the players do not go to court in the second stage. Instead the losing 
player may give up, or the players may agree on a settlement.  
 
We now examine the role of the public trust in the courts, by varying the confidence levels 
in the courts (r1 and r2). Suppose first that the confidence is lower for all instances. This 
affects the decisions in both stages. The effects on the decisions in the first stage are due to 
the importance of the trust in the court of first instance for the probability with which each 
player expects to win a trial in the first stage. First, if a player, say i, believes that he probably 
is right (ρ1i > 0.5), then his reduced confidence in the court of first instance also reduces the 
probability with which he expects to win in first instance. However, if player i believes that he 
probably is wrong (ρ1i < 0.5), then he hopes that the court will make a mistake. Therefore he 
thinks it is more likely to win the first trial when the verdict in first instance is less reliable. 
Thus, if the critical value for having a credible threat is lower than 0.5, then this critical value 
will decrease in the perceived reliability of the court of first instance. So if the confidence in 
the court of first instance is reduced, P is more likely to have a credible threat. Second, as is 
apparent from Eq. (11), if players are jointly optimistic, they will be less so if their confidence 
in the court of first instance decreases. Hence, a reduced level of trust in the courts will 
ensure that the players are less likely to go to court. 
In the second stage, the decisions are not only affected by the reduced confidence in the 
court of second instance (along the lines as discussed for the first stage), but also by the 
reduced confidence in the court of first instance. Due to the latter, the players adjust their 
beliefs less after the verdict in first instance. Therefore the unsatisfied player is more likely to 
have a credible threat if there is less confidence in the court of first instance. However, the 
effects of the confidence in the court of first instance on the degree of joint optimism in the 
second stage are analytically unclear. The numerical results suggest that there is an 
increase in the level of joint optimism due to the lower r1 which is larger than the decrease in 
joint optimism as a result of the reduced r2. Hence the appeal rate is higher when the 
confidence in both instances is lower. 
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Figure 8. Scenario 1, myopic players, r1 = r2 = 0.8 
                                                                                                                                                     
Observe also that Conclusions 2 and 7 from Section 5.3 imply that pgi ∈ [0.05, 0.95] for any player 
and any part of the game, given that the confidence in the courts is equal to 0.95. 
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Figure 8 presents the results for r1 = r2 = 0.8. Note that, as p1P is at least 0.2, player P 
always has a credible threat in model OLD (see Figure 5). Figure 8 shows that (i) in Stage 1 
player P is less likely to give up (namely: never), (ii) in Stage 1 players are less likely to go to 
court, and (iii) the appeal rate is higher (in fact, it is equal to one).  
 
Finally, we are interested in the effects of having different levels of confidence in the courts 
of first and second instance18. To gain some insight in this matter, we study the case where 
r1 = 0.8 and r2 = 0.95. We assume here that although the players are myopic, they do know 
that the court of second instance is, in their opinion, more ‘reliable’. Hence, during the first 
stage they expect that the probability of winning a trial in the second stage is equal to  
E1i(p2i) = ρ1i r2 + (1 – ρ1i) (1 – r2). 
Figure 9 shows the results for Scenario 1 in model NEW. 
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Figure 9a. Scenario 1, myopic players, r1 = 0.8, r2 = 0.95: P wins the first trial 
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Figure 9b. Scenario 1, myopic players, r1 = 0.8, r2 = 0.95: A wins the first trial 
 
                                                
18 See also Shavell (1995). 
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As could be expected, Figure 9 is a cross between Figures 7 and 8. Note that, during Stage 
1, the estimated probabilities and expected outcomes for Stage 2 are the same as in Figure 
7. However the estimated probability of winning or losing the first trial is somewhat different. 
Therefore the decisions in the first stage in Figure 9 differ only slightly from those in Figure 7. 
However, the results for the second stage in Figure 9 are very to Figure 8. Because players 
learn relatively little from the verdict of the first court, they do not adjust their beliefs (ρ) much. 
As a result, in most cases the players will prefer to go to court in the second stage if they did 
so in the first stage. Sometimes, there is a reduction in the level of joint optimism, which is 
large enough to make a settlement acceptable to the players. 
 
Summarizing, for the case with myopic players we can conclude that: 
1. Since players are myopic, they do not take into account that they will learn from the 
verdict of the court of first instance. Hence Conclusion 1 of Section 4.3 that the 
introduction of the court of second instance leads to less trials in Stage 1 applies 
here too. 
2. Since players in Stage 2 have learned from the verdict, they may act differently than 
in Section 4. Depending on the level of confidence in the instances, the appeal rate 
may be anything from 0 to 1. 
3. Given joint optimism by the players, they are more likely to go to the court of first 
instance if the confidence in courts is higher. The appeal rate will, however, be 
lower. 
4. The results suggest that, in model NEW, the confidence in the appeals court is of 
major importance for the decisions for Stage 1, while the confidence in the court of 
first instance is of major importance for the decisions in Stage 2. 
The effects of introducing a court of second instance depend largely on the level of 
confidence in the OLD case19. If there was much confidence (relative to the 
confidence in the appeals court in NEW), then the number of trials in first instance 
decreases, because of the additional costs of the expected appeal case. If there 
was relatively little confidence, then the number of trials may increase. On the one 
hand, the expected appeals case in the second stage increases the incentives for 
players to settle in the first stage; on the other hand, the higher confidence in the 
court of second instance increases the joint optimism in the final outcome, which 
increases the incentives for players to go to court20.  
5.5 Players are far-sighted 
When players are myopic, the information contained in the verdict in first instance affects 
the decisions in Stage 2 only. However, far-sighted players do realize at the start of the first 
stage how any verdict will affect the beliefs and decisions in the second stage. Knowing that, 
the players may prefer different actions in the first stage. 
Figure 10 presents the results for Scenario 1 if r1 = r2 = 0.95. During the second stage 
myopic and far-sighted players choose of course the same actions (Figure 7).  
 
Looking at the first stage, we see that far-sighted players are more likely to go to court. The 
cause is, of course, that players realize that the expected outcomes in the second stage are 
different, because players learn from the verdict in the first stage. It is for instance possible 
that the unsatisfied player gives up (because that player lost too much faith in his case), or 
that players agree to settle (because the level of joint optimism decreases sufficiently). If 
                                                
19 Note that all myopic players expect that any trial in the first stage will certainly result in a trial in the 
second stage, for the additional costs are lower than the disputed amount, while the level of optimism 
does not decrease (r2 ≥ r1). 
20 The last possibility is unlikely in the case of the additional court in the Dutch tax litigation, as the 
only court in the OLD situation was the ‘Gerechtshof’, while in the NEW situation the ‘Gerechtshof’ is 
the court of second instance. Therefore, the quality of the single instance in the OLD situation is likely 
to be similar to that of the second instance in the NEW situation. 
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players know that in the second stage players will either give up or settle, then they are more 
likely to go to court in the first stage because they expect to have less legal costs in the 
second stage, while – due to the updating of players conditional on the verdict in first 
instance – the disputed amount remains sufficiently large in Stage 1. 
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Figure 10a. Scenario 1, far-sighted players, r1 = r2 = 0.95: P wins the first trial 
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Figure 10b. Scenario 1, far-sighted players, r1 = r2 = 0.95: A wins the first trial 
 
Observe also that P is more likely to give up, unless A has much faith in A’s position. This 
can be explained as follows. Note that B loses faith in his case if he loses in first instance, 
but becomes more confident if he wins. Suppose now that A is not too sure about his case. 
In the neighborhood of the border between G and S, P expects to lose. Moreover after losing 
in Stage 1, P loses so much faith in his case, that he won’t have a credible threat in Stage 2. 
Combined this outweighs the gains which P has after winning in first instance. Consequently 
P is more likely to give up at the start.  
Now suppose that A is quite sure about his case. Then it is less important whether P has a 
credible threat after losing in first instance: the resulting settlement (if a settlement is at all 
possible) is quite unattractive to P anyhow. However, if P wins then the settlement may 
become worthwhile, since A loses faith. This second effect outweighs the first if initially A has 
much faith in his position. 
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Figure 11. Scenario 1, far-sighted players, r1 = r2 = 0.8 
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Figure 12a. Scenario 1, far-sighted players, r1 = 0.8, r2 = 0.95: P wins the first trial 
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Figure 12b. Scenario 1, far-sighted players, r1 = 0.8, r2 = 0.95: A wins the first trial 
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Note that the appeal rate depends on the joint distribution of beliefs ρ1P and ρ1A. If these 
beliefs are uniformly distributed than the appeal rate is lower with far-sighted players than 
with myopic players. So the appeal rate may be lowered both by the updating of players (see 
Section 5.4), as by the prospect of players updating in future. 
 
As we did in Section 5.4, we look at the role of the confidence in the courts by considering 
two alternative cases. In the first case we assume that r1 = r2 = 0.8 (see Figure 11) and in the 
second that r1 = 0.8 and r2 =0.95 (see Figure 12). 
Figure 11 differs only marginally from Figure 8. The difference is that here players know 
that their beliefs will change after the first verdict. As a consequence their expected costs of 
the appeals case increase, and their incentives to go to court in Stage 1 decrease. Finally, 
Figure 12 is a cross between Figures 10 and 11, just as Figure 9 was a cross between 
Figures 7 and 8. 
 
Summarizing, we find that: 
1. The main conclusions for myopic players also apply to far-sighted players. 
− The introduction of a court of second instance leads to less trials in first 
instance. 
− Depending on the amount of confidence people have in the courts, the appeal 
rate can vary from 0 to 1. 
− Given the faith players have in their positions, when the confidence in the courts 
is higher players will go to trial more often in first instance. The appeal rate, 
however, will be lower.  
2. If the confidence in courts is high and the appeal rate is clearly smaller than 1, then 
players will go to court more often if they are far-sighted than if they are myopic. 
6 Final considerations 
In this section we consider a few topics which are relevant in the context of this paper, but 
are outside the scope of our model. In Section 6.1 we discuss the fact that, in many cases, 
the tax administration is a repeat player who is not only interested in the outcome of the 
current dispute, but also of future disputes. In Section 6.2 we consider the incentives of tax 
payers to evade taxes. Section 6.3 discusses the effects of risk aversion of players. Finally, 
Sections 6.4 considers the role of asymmetric information. 
6.1 The tax administration as a repeat player. 
 
The judgment of a court also depends on case law, i.e. on the verdicts in previous similar 
cases. So if the court’s verdict favors the tax payer in the present case, future verdicts in 
similar cases are more likely to favor the tax payer. This observation is mainly relevant to the 
tax administration, which is involved in every tax dispute and (thus) in many similar disputes. 
The tax administration is therefore a repeat player in the terminology of Galanter (1974). We 
expect that in general the tax payer is a one-shot player, who does not expect to be involved 
in a similar tax dispute again. 
 
Consider model OLD. In this model the effects of case law are relatively clear, especially 
when case law is of such importance that all future verdicts will follow the current verdict. 
Because tax payer P is a one-shot player, P is only interested in the outcome of this dispute. 
The tax administration (A) however knows that if he goes to court now on this matter, he will 
never have to go to court again on this matter, because in all future similar cases players 
know what the court’s verdict will be. Therefore, if A expects similar cases in future, then the 
expected benefits to A of going to court are larger, while the expected costs are the same. As 
a consequence, it is less likely that there exists a settlement amount which is acceptable to 
both players. Hence players are more likely to go to court. 
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In model NEW the consequences of A being a repeat player are much less straightforward. 
Naturally, we could do a similar analysis in NEW as we did in OLD.  The results could be 
that, if case law is important in both OLD and NEW, the introduction of a second substantive 
instance leads to less trials in first instance, all of which are followed by an appeal case; and 
moreover, that the number of trials in first instance is higher than without case law. 
However, such analysis avoids certain essential issues. For example, it is relevant whether 
verdicts of courts in first and in second instance are equally important in case law, and, if not, 
which weight is being attached to which instance. Similarly it matters what weight (if any at 
all) is attached by the appeals court to the verdict of the court of first instance. If players 
expect that the verdict of the court of second instance depends (to some degree) on the 
verdict in first instance, then players will realize that their chances in the appeals court 
depend on whether they won or lost in the court of first instance. Hence players should 
condition the estimates of their chances in second instance on the outcome in first instance 
(see also Section 5). Such an analysis is outside the scope of this paper. 
6.2 Tax evasion 
By tax evasion we mean the attempt to pay less taxes than one ought to pay, hence it 
excludes ‘honest mistakes’ by tax payers. Although measuring tax evasion is extraordinarily 
complicated, it is clear that a substantial share of the tax statements is too low. In their 
review article Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) estimate on basis of data from the 
American tax administration IRS, that a third of the US households attempts to evade taxes.  
Andreoni et al. also review the large theoretical literature on the choice of tax payers 
whether or not to evade taxes. In their seminal article, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
assume that there is a tax payer P, who knows how much taxes he should pay, the likelihood 
with which an attempt at evasion is successful and the penalty which follows discovery of the 
fraud. Given that knowledge, P decides for which amount (if any) he tries to evade his taxes. 
In later literature this decision is often formulated as a game, in which the tax administration 
(A) decides on the intensity (or probability) with which they review tax statements, thereby 
determining the probability of evading taxes successfully. Of course, a more intensive review 
process costs more, but an uncovered attempt at tax evasion yields additional benefits (more 
tax revenues plus the fine) to A. Naturally, P has stronger incentives to evade taxes if the A 
is less likely to find out, while A has stronger incentives to review the tax statements if 
evasion is more probable21.  
There are many variations and extensions to this model in the literature. In part of that 
literature the choice of A is modeled, while in the other part the probability of discovering 
fraud and the fining scheme are given. 
 
From the theory it is known that less taxes are evaded when the expected penalty is more 
severe (e.g. due to increased fines or higher probability of getting caught). It is interesting to 
see what the results of the additional instance in tax litigation implies for the amount of tax 
evasion, using the model described above.  
If tax payer P evades taxes and he is caught, than the tax agency charges him for an 
amount (Y) equal to the amount of taxes evaded plus some fine. Because P knows that he is 
wrong (tax evasion is intentional), he will have relatively little faith in his case. In contrast, tax 
administration (A) will have much faith. It seems likely that the height of the fines is not 
affected by the additional instance. However, the presence of a court of second instance can 
affect the outcomes for P if he gets caught, for example by affecting the strategies of the 
players. Figure 5 enables us to distinguish the following effects. 
− If P has little faith in his case, and A has much faith in his, then the introduction of the 
court of second instance makes it less likely that P has a credible threat. Tax evasion 
becomes therefore less attractive. 
                                                
21 As a consequence, the resulting game typically has no pure Nash equilibrium. 
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− As far as P can threaten credibly, players are more likely to settle. But if players go to 
the court of first instance, they also go to the appeals court. The expected legal costs of 
getting caught may therefore increase or decrease, making tax evasion less 
respectively more attractive. 
− The settlement amount is affected too by the additional instance. If the expected legal 
costs in an appeal case are higher for P than for A, then the bargaining position of P is 
weakened by the extra instance. Then tax evasion is less attractive. 
An additional effect of the additional instance is that this may influence the probability with 
which the tax evader is caught. The more time tax inspectors spend in court, the less time 
they have for finding fraud.  
 
Concluding, the introduction of an additional instance in the tax litigation has several effects 
on the attractiveness of tax evasion for tax payers. The net effect, however, remains unclear 
without more information on e.g. the joint distribution of estimates by the players. 
6.3 Risk aversion 
Our model does not include all possible costs and benefits. Examples of excluded costs 
and benefits are the social condemnation (or approval) after a conviction, (indirect) costs 
related to the required time to litigate (or settle) the case, or a possible aversion to risk. Here 
we focus on the latter. 
 
We can make three observations. Firstly, since risk averse tax payers are less inclined to 
take risks, they will be more careful in filing their tax statements. This leads to less tax 
disputes. Secondly, if there is a dispute, the tax payer will typically have much faith in his 
case. The tax payer is therefore more likely to prefer going to court to either settling or giving 
up. Thirdly, tax payers will dislike the risk involved in a trial, and therefore be more likely to 
prefer a settlement or giving up to a trial. Clearly the last two effects are opposite to each 
other. Whether the share of the disputes which are given up, settled respectively tried 
increases or decreases depends on which of the last two effects dominate. However, for the 
effects of risk aversion on the total number of cases in court, we should also consider the 
first. This first effect lowers the total number of tax disputes. Therefore the number of tax 
cases in court may still be lower due to risk aversion, even if the second effect dominates the 
third effect. The total effect is therefore a priori unclear. 
6.4 Asymmetric Information 
A substantial strand of the literature gives asymmetric information as an explanation for 
cases in court. See for instance Bebchuk (1984), Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and 
Daughety and Reinganum (2005). Because players cannot verify each others information, 
they have different estimations of their chances in court. As a result, there may not exist a 
settlement agreement which is acceptable to both players. 
This asymmetry in information is an explanation of why players may have different 
estimates of the chances of the plaintiff. However, if in the court of first instance all 
information is revealed, there is no asymmetry in information in the second stage. Hence, if 
all differences in the estimations were due to asymmetric information, then players will share 
the same estimates during the second stage and they will not go to trial in the second stage. 
In this respect it is worthwhile to note that parties in an appeals case may only rely on 
evidence which was either used in the court of first instance and on new evidence which that 
party did not have to know before. 
 
Concluding, we can say that, in as far as the differences in estimates of players are caused 
by asymmetric information and given that this asymmetry is removed in the court of first 
instance, the appeal rate will be lower. 
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7 Conclusions 
Since January 2005, Dutch tax litigation has a second substantive instance. In this paper, 
we extended a standard theoretical model to investigate which effects this change has on the 
way in which players end the dispute. Where the non-linearities and large number of model 
parameters required it, we employed some representative numerical simulations to 
supplement the analysis. 
 
In the first part of the paper (Sections 3 and 4) we followed the existing literature by using 
given estimates of the players of their chances in court. This enabled us to formulate 
answers to our first three questions. Questions 1 and 2 involved the influence of the 
additional substantive instance on the decisions in the first stage, so on the likelihood with 
which the players go to court, with which they settle, respectively with which the tax payer 
gives up. The third question was which appeal rate we can expect.  
In general, it appeared, it is unclear whether tax payers will take action against a tax 
assessment more or less often after the extra instance is introduced. This depends on the 
actual joint distribution of the chances players expect to have in court. What we can say is 
that, given this distribution, players will go to trial less often than before. In other words, 
players should jointly be more optimistic before they go to court. Also the model predicts that 
the appeal rate equals one, so the party who lost will always appeal. 
Furthermore, the likelihood with which a dispute is brought to court depends positively on 
the disputed amount and the refund of legal costs the tax payer can obtain if he wins. It 
depends negatively on the legal costs of the players and the court fees. 
 
Partly because of the improbably high appeal rate, we extended the model further in the 
second part of this paper (Section 5). There the probability by which a player expects to win 
in court is split into two components: (i) the probability that this player is right, and (ii) the 
probability that the verdict of the court is correct. This has several effects. For instance, the 
probability of winning a case in court estimated by the players is limited by the confidence 
they have in the verdict of that court. If players have less faith in the judgment of the court, 
their level of joint optimism is lower and they are less likely to go to court. 
However, the distinction between the probability of being right and winning a trial is also 
relevant for the faith players have in their chances in the second stage. For example, the 
verdict of the court of first instance is a signal of who is right. Players may use this 
information to improve their own estimates of being right. If players are myopic, the 
consequences are limited to the second stage only. But if players are far-sighted, this also 
affects their decisions in the first stage. 
The analysis shows that if players have perfect confidence in the judgment of the courts, 
the verdict of the first court will be executed. Therefore the appeal rate is equal to zero. 
Moreover if players are far-sighted, they act exactly as in model OLD, for they now that the 
players abide by the verdict of the court of first instance.  
The results are different when the confidence in courts is less than perfect. Then fewer 
cases go to court in the first stage, but the appeal rate will be higher. 
 
As a final comment, we emphasize that the model considers existing tax disputes. In other 
words, the substantive tax law and the degree of tax evasion are considered given. Naturally, 
also these two factors may and will change over time. 
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